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  In the recent banking literature on the relationship between credit risk and the 
business cycle, the presence of asymmetric effects both across credit risk regimes and 
through the business cycle has been generally neglected. Employing threshold 
regression models both at the aggregate and the bank level and exploiting a unique 
dataset on Italian bank borrowers’ default rates, this paper analyzes whether this 
relationship is characterized by regime switches and thus by asymmetries, determining 
the thresholds endogenously. Our results show that not only are the effects of the 
business cycle on credit risk more pronounced during downturns but also when credit 
risk conditions are poor. 
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** Bank of Italy, Banking and Financial Supervision. 1.  Introduction
1 
In the recent banking literature, the relationship between credit risk and the 
business cycle has been analyzed for both (macro) financial stability and (micro) risk 
management purposes. Indeed, the potential impact of economic developments on 
banks’ portfolios is relevant for both policy makers, interested in forecasting and 
preventing banks’ instability due to unfavorable economic conditions, and risk 
managers, who pay attention to the robustness of their capital allocation plans under 
different scenarios. These different perspectives are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the 
reform of the Basel Accord on banks’ capital requirements made clear the need to match 
both the micro and macro dimensions. 
From a macro prudential point of view, many analyses have quantified the 
effects of macroeconomic conditions on asset quality (for a survey, see Quagliariello, 
2008). As an example, Pesola (2001) shows that shortfalls of GDP growth below 
forecast contributed to the banking crises in the Nordic countries, while Salas and 
Saurina (2002) document that macroeconomic shocks are quickly transmitted to Spanish 
banks’ portfolio riskiness. Similarly, using Italian data, Marcucci and Quagliariello 
(2008) find that bank borrowers’ default rates increase in downturns. Meyer and Yeager 
(2001) and Gambera (2000) document that a small number of macroeconomic variables 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Max Bruche, Dick van Dijk, Giuseppe Grande, Ashay Kadam, Aneel 
Keswani, Sebastiano Laviola, Francesca Lotti, Alistair Milne, Domenico J. Marchetti, Fabio Panetta, 
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Nazionale, 91, 00184, Rome, Italy; Tel. +39-06-4792-4069. Emails: Juri Marcucci 
(juri.marcucci@bancaditalia.it), Mario Quagliariello (mario.quagliariello@bancaditalia.it). The views 
expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.   
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are good predictors for the share of non-performing loans in the US. Similarly, 
Hoggarth et al. (2005) provide evidence of a direct link between the state of the UK 
business cycle and banks’ write-offs. Analogous evidence is provided in cross-country 
comparisons by Bikker and Hu (2002), Laeven and Majoni (2003) and Valckx (2003).  
However, the vast majority of these studies generally neglect asymmetric 
effects, i.e., the possibility that the impact of macroeconomic conditions on banks’ 
portfolio riskiness is dissimilar in different phases of the business cycle.
2 
By contrast, these asymmetries are somewhat taken into account in a number of 
studies on credit risk management. In particular, some studies on the properties of credit 
rating transition matrices (i.e., of the probability of borrowers migrating from one rating 
class to another) over the cycle have analyzed whether transition probabilities are 
affected to a larger (smaller) extent by recessionary (expansionary) conditions. Regime 
switching models are commonly used for this kind of investigations. On the basis of 
GDP growth, Nickell et al. (2000) divide the business cycle into three categories (peaks, 
normal times and troughs) finding that in peaks low-rated bonds are less prone to 
downgrades. The impact of macroeconomic conditions appears therefore to be 
asymmetric and dependent on the starting creditworthiness of each borrower.  
In their analysis of the linkage between macroeconomic conditions and 
migration matrices Bangia et al. (2002) distinguish two states of the economy, 
expansion and recession, and condition the transition matrix to these states. Their 
findings  suggest  that  downgrading  probabilities,  particularly  in  the  extreme classes,  
                                                 
2 To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is the paper by Gasha and Morales (2004) who 
apply a SETAR model to country-level data showing that GDP growth affects non-performing loans only 
below a certain threshold.   
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increase significantly in recessions. Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) adopt a similar 
framework in order to assess the impact of the business cycle on capital requirements 
under Basel 2. This approach requires the identification of expansions/recessions based 
on some external sources.
3 In our view, a further shortcoming of this literature is that 
the hypothesis that asymmetries depend on the severity of the recession rather than on 
the dichotomy expansion/recession is completely ignored. 
In this paper, we analyze the asymmetries in the relationship between credit risk 
and the business cycle using threshold regression models both at the aggregate level and 
the bank level. We test whether the impact of the business cycle is more pronounced 
when either credit risk levels are higher or economic conditions are worse, identifying 
endogenously the threshold over/below which such impact is different. We start with a 
standard threshold regression approach at the aggregate level and then move ahead, 
suggesting some panel threshold regression models with one or more threshold 
variables. These can be interpreted as regime switching panel data models where each 
regime is determined endogenously through one or more observable threshold variables. 
Also, we exploit a unique dataset on Italian borrowers’ default rates at the bank level. 
We also suggest an innovative four-regime approach with two different threshold 
variables which allows us to provide a more comprehensive picture of the behavior of 
default rates over changing economic and credit risk conditions.  
At the aggregate level, we find that banks’ portfolio riskiness is mostly affected 
by the business cycle during downturns and also when portfolio quality is not good. 
Similar results are obtained exploiting the cross-sectional dimension of our rich dataset. 
                                                 
3 Most studies in this field employ the NBER business cycle classifications. Lucas and Klaassen 
(2006) cast serious doubts on their use.   
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For those banks with lower asset quality, the increase in default rates due to one 
percentage point decrease in the output gap (our measure of the business cycle) is 
almost nine times higher than the effect for those banks with better portfolios. 
Furthermore, from our results, we notice that the impact of the business cycle on credit 
risk is stronger the lower the banks’ asset quality for models with two or more regimes 
with one threshold variable.  
In the four-regime model, where we combine credit risk and the business cycle 
regimes, we find that i) during economic slowdowns, the impact of the business cycle 
on portfolio riskiness for banks with lower asset quality is three times higher than that 
for sound banks. Also, ii) the impact of the business cycle on credit risk for banks with 
lower asset quality (the a priori riskier ones) during recessions is almost five times 
higher than what we have during booms. In addition, iii) during recessions the impact of 
the business cycle on credit risk for banks with better asset quality is almost the double 
of that during expansions. Finally, iv) the impact of the business cycle on banks’ 
riskiness during expansionary phases is substantially the same both for riskier and less 
risky banks. 
In sum, riskier banks’ portfolios are more cyclical (i.e., more sensitive to the 
business cycle) than less risky ones and cyclicality is more pronounced in bad economic 
times. Several checks strongly support the robustness of our empirical results under 
different hypotheses and circumstances.  
Under the Basel 2 new Capital Accord, which introduces risk sensitive capital 
requirements, this evidence may provide some guidance to banks and supervisors in the 
choice of adequate capital buffers over different phases of the business cycle.   
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Furthermore, the methodology we propose may be easily adopted for stress testing 
purposes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data on Italian banks’ 
portfolios. Section III presents the single threshold model at the aggregate level with 
two regimes and the related empirical results. In section IV we describe the panel data 
model with single threshold variable and multiple regimes (both credit risk and the 
business cycle regimes) along with the empirical results. Section V delineates the panel 
data model with two different threshold variables and four regimes and the associated 
empirical results. Finally, section VI draws some concluding remarks and directions for 
further research. 
 
2.  Data 
Our data set comprises both data on Italian banks and macroeconomic time 
series on a quarterly basis for a period spanning from 1989Q4 to 2005Q2. Accounting 
ratios for the individual institutions are built up using the statistics that intermediaries 
are required to report to the Bank of Italy while the macroeconomic variables are drawn 
from the OECD statistics. 
Since we want to analyze the evolution of banks’ portfolio riskiness over the 
business cycle, the starting point for building up our dataset is the choice of an adequate 
measure of credit risk.  
In Italy, banks must value loans in their portfolios at their estimated realizable 
value. In particular, the exposures to insolvent borrowers are classified as bad loans.   
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Since Italian banks tend to correctly classify their exposures with appropriate timing 
(Moody’s, 2003) and bad loans are a good ex-post indicator of the riskiness of banks’ 
debtors, we compute our riskiness indicator as the ratio of the flow of loans classified as 
bad debts in the reference quarter to the stock of outstanding performing loans at the 
end of the previous one. The ratio can be interpreted as the default rate of Italian banks’ 
borrowers. With respect to other riskiness indicators, based on stock measures, such as 
the non-performing loan ratio, the default rate is a more precise and timely proxy for 
banks’ portfolio riskiness.
4  
Since default rates from the Central Credit Register are available at the bank 
level, we can exploit the cross-sectional dimension and work at different levels of 
aggregation, from the whole banking system to each single bank’s portfolio. 
The initial dataset on individual banks goes from 1989Q1 to 2005Q2 with a total 
of 44,293 bank-quarter observations. The first quarter is deleted to compute the default 
rate. We have also excluded those banks with incomplete (or missing) information or 
those characterized by extreme observations for the variables of interest. We have then 
balanced the panel so that the resulting final dataset includes 212 banks spanning from 
1990Q1 to 2005Q2 for a total of 13,144 observations. In the final sample we have 73 
limited banks, 18 cooperative banks and 121 mutual banks for 62 quarters. 
Regarding the proxy for the Italian business cycle, we focus on the output gap, 
defined as the difference between the actual and the potential gross domestic product. 
We compute a first measure of the output gap as the difference between the actual 
output and an estimate of the potential given by a linear trend (GAPT). For robustness, 
                                                 
4 A stock measure can be misleading because of write-offs and securitizations, which reduce the total 
amount of bad loans regardless the actual change in portfolio’s riskiness.   
  9
as alternative proxies, we employ also the deviations of the GDP series from the 
Hodrick-Prescott filtered series (GAPHP) and the usual GDP growth rate (GDPG).
5 
Figure 1 depicts all the three macroeconomic time series. The shaded areas show the 
recessions in the Italian economy according to the Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica 
(ISAE).
6 Within our sample period, the ISAE identifies 3 recessions: 1992Q2-1993Q2, 
1995Q4-1996Q3 and 2001Q1-2004Q4. While the two measures of output gap correctly 
signal all the three recessions, the GDP growth is more ambiguous for the last one. This 
is due to the fact that the 2001-2004 recession is in reality a period of prolonged 
stagnation, as suggested by the ISAE which refers to this period as an anomalous cycle. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the final sample, both the bank level 
and the macro data on alternative indicators of the Italian business cycle. The 
disaggregated default rate is related to the final sample of 212 banks while the aggregate 
one gives the characteristics of the time series. The individual default rate has a mean of 
about 0.30% and a median of 0.26% with a right-skewed distribution. The time series of 
the aggregate default rate shows a mean of 0.55% and a less skewed distribution with 
respect to the individual series. The second micro variable is the logarithm of all banks’ 
total assets (in million of euros) which is used as a proxy for banks’ size. The last micro 
variable is the difference between the loan growth rate of each bank i at time t and the 
average loan growth rate for each quarter. This variable is added to control for more 
                                                 
5 The use of regional breakdowns for GDP may provide valuable insights on possible differences 
across different geographical areas. Unfortunately, these data are not available on a quarterly basis. 
6 The ISAE is an Italian Research Institute which provides an ‘almost’ official chronology of the 
Italian business cycle. We say ‘almost’ official because in Italy there is not an officially accepted business 
cycle chronology as that of the NBER for the United States. To take note of the specific features of the 
Italian economy, the ISAE does not adopt the NBER methodology, but that suggested by Altissimo et al. 
(2000).    
  10




3.  Single Threshold Model at the Aggregate level with Two Regimes 
3.1. The Model 
Our starting hypothesis is that the default rate is affected by the business cycle 
and that such impact is subject to one or more regime-switches that characterize 
asymmetries. If the observed data on the dependent variable (default rate) are 
1,, T dr dr K , the simplest model that relates the latter with macroeconomic conditions 
(proxied by a measure of the output gap,  t GAP) under the hypothesis of one regime only 
(i.e. with no thresholds) can be written as  
  01 11 1 tt t dr GAP e β β − = ++  (1) 
where  t e  is assumed to be a martingale difference sequence with respect to the sigma 
algebra generated by the past history of the variables. This model can be simply 
estimated by OLS. A more general model allows for the presence of two regimes 
defined by an observable threshold variable  t q  that can be either the dependent or the 
independent variable.
8 In the former case, the model becomes  
                                                 
7 Also, the use of the loan growth rate could duplicate the signal from the business cycle indicator. 
8 Threshold regression models are regime-switching models where each regime is determined by the 
value of a particular observable threshold variable. These models differ from the regime-switching 
models à la Hamilton (Hamilton, 1989) because in the latter each regime is governed by an unobserved 
state variable which is usually modeled as a first-order Markov chain. For details see Hamilton (1994) or 
Franses and Van Dijk (2000).   
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  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 11 1 02 12 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e ββ γ ββ γ −− =+ ≤ ++ > +  (2) 
where  () I ⋅  is the indicator function and γ  is the threshold.
9 In this case we are 
distinguishing the two regimes with respect to the overall credit risk conditions. The 
model gives an estimate of γ  which can be viewed as the threshold  ˆ γ  that characterizes 
good credit risk conditions, i.e.  ( ) ˆ t Id r γ ≤ , from bad credit risk conditions, i.e. 
() ˆ t Id r γ > .  
When the threshold variable is the independent variable, the model becomes 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 11 1 1 02 12 1 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I GAP GAP I GAP e ββ γ ββ γ −− −− =+ ≤ ++ > +  (3) 
Here we characterize each regime depending on the general macroeconomic conditions, 
distinguishing between recessionary conditions  ( ) 1 ˆ t IG A P γ − ≤  and expansionary phases 
() 1 ˆ t IG A P γ − > . The models can be more compactly represented as  
  ( ) 1 ' tt t dr GAP e γθ − = +  (4) 
where  () ( ) ( ) ()
''
11 1 , tt t t t GAP GAP I q GAP I q γ γγ −− − =≤ > ,  ()
' '
11 1, tt GAP GAP −− =  and 
() 01 02 11 12 ,,, θ ββββ = . The parameters of interest are the coefficients θ  and the 
threshold γ . Even though the regression equation (4) is non linear in the parameters, it 
can be estimated through least squares (LS). Under the additional assumption that 
et ~ N 0,σ
2 ( ), LS is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation. These models can 
                                                 
9 For convenience, throughout the paper we use γ  or  j γ  to indicate the threshold independently of 
the threshold variable.    
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be estimated by sequential conditional LS. For any given value of γ , the LS estimate of 
θ  is  














= ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∑∑  (5) 
with residuals  () ( ) ( )
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Tt t Te σ γγ
−
= = ∑ . The LS estimate of γ  is the value that minimizes the residual 
variance, i.e.  





= ) )  (6) 
where  , γ γ ⎡⎤ Γ=⎣⎦ . The minimization problem in (6) can be solved by direct search. The 
residual variance  ()
2 ˆT σγ  takes on at most T  distinct values as γ  varies. Thus, to obtain 
the LS estimates of (6) we can run OLS regression of (4) for γ ∈Γ, where the elements 
of  Γ are slightly less than T  because we have to take a certain percentage () % η  of 
observations out to ensure that each regime has a minimum number of observations. 
Then the value of γ  that minimizes the residual variance is the LS estimate of the 
threshold parameter. The LS estimates of the coefficients θ  are then found as  () ˆˆ ˆ θ θγ = . 
Similarly, the LS residuals are  ( ) 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ' tt ed rG A Pγ θ − =− , with sample variance 
()
22 ˆ ˆˆ TT σ σγ = .
10  
                                                 
10 Since the estimated threshold is superconsistent (Chan, 1993), to make inference on the slope 
parameters we can act as if the threshold were known using standard asymptotic theory for LS estimates. 
Thus our confidence intervals for the estimated parameters throughout the paper are conditional on the 
estimated threshold. Nevertheless, following Hansen (1999), to make inference on the estimated 
thresholds we invert the LR test.   
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An important question is whether it is statistically sensible to move from the 
linear specification in (1) to the model in (2). The relevant null hypothesis that there are 
no asymmetries in the relationship between credit risk and the business cycle is 
01 2 : jj H β β = ,  0,1 j = . From an econometric point of view this testing problem is non 
standard because there are some parameters that under the null are not identified (the so-
called ‘Davies’ problem’). Based on the theories of Davies (1977, 1987) and Andrews 
and Ploberger (1994), Hansen (1996) shows that if the errors are iid, a test with near-
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= ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∑∑ %  (8) 
Since  T F  is a monotonic function of 
2 ˆT σ , it has been shown that  ( ) sup TT FF γ γ ∈Γ =  
where  () () ( ) ( )
22 2 ˆˆ TT T T FT γ σσ γσ γ =− %  is the pointwise F-statistic against the 
alternative  11 2 : jj H β β ≠  when γ  is known. Since γ  is not identified, the asymptotic 
distribution of  T F  is not a 
2 χ . Hansen (1996) shows that the asymptotic distribution of 
T F  can be approximated by a bootstrap procedure. Letting 
*
t u ,  1, , tT = K  be iid  () 0,1 N  
and setting 
**
tt dr u = , we can regress 
*
t dr  on the observations  1 t GAP−  to obtain 
*2
T σ %  and   
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on  () 1 t GAP γ −  to obtain 
*2 ˆT σ . Thus we can form the statistic 
() () () ()
** 2 * 2 * 2 ˆˆ TT T T FT γ σσ γσ γ =− %  and  ( )
** sup TT FF γ γ ∈Γ = . Hansen (1996) shows that 
the distribution of 
*
T F  converges weakly in probability to the null distribution of  T F  
under local alternatives for θ . Therefore, repeated bootstrap draws from 
*
T F  can be 
used to approximate the asymptotic null distribution of  T F . The bootstrap 
approximation to the asymptotic p-value of the test is constructed by counting the 
percentage of bootstrap samples for which 
*
T F  exceeds the observed  T F . If the errors 
are conditionally heteroskedastic, it is necessary to replace the F-statistic  () T F γ  with a 
heteroskedasticity consistent Wald or Lagrange multiplier test. Setting  [ ] R II =− , 
() () () 11 1 '
T
Tt t t MG A P G A P γγ γ −− = =∑  and  () () ()
2
11 1 ˆ '
T
Tt t t t VG A P G A P e γγ γ −− = =∑ , then 
the pointwise Wald statistic is 
  () () () () () () ( ) ()





and the appropriate test for the null is  ( ) sup TT WW γ γ ∈Γ = . To obtain the bootstrap p-
value, it is sufficient to repeat the bootstrap procedure as before setting 
** ˆ tt t dr eu = . 
 
3.2. Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the results for the two-regime threshold model estimated using 
aggregate data. Given the short time span of our data, in our preferred parsimonious 
model, the default rate dr only depends on one-quarter lag of the business cycle   
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indicator. The results for model 1 confirm the well-known negative relationship 
between default rates and the business cycle, when there are no regime changes.
11 
Our second set of results shows the impact of the business cycle depending on 
the level of banks’ riskiness, proxied by either contemporaneous or lagged default rate 
(dr), respectively models 2 and 3. We note that there is a regime switch when bank 
borrowers’ default rates are above a threshold of 0.54% which is very close to both the 
mean and median of the aggregate default rate.
12 In particular, the statistical significance 
and magnitude of  12 β  suggest that when asset quality is lower, economic conditions 
have a statistically significant impact on banks’ riskiness. By contrast, in less-risky 
periods (i.e. when dr is below the threshold) the impact of the business cycle on default 
rates is almost nil and not significant. The LR test for the null of no regime switch is 
significant at any conventional level, suggesting that the model is appropriate.
13 
As we mentioned above, an advantage of our methodology is that it allows to 
obtain an endogenous estimate of the threshold. Looking at Table 2, we observe that the 
value of the threshold is very similar across models and specifications, ranging between 
0.54 and 0.58%. Taken at its face value, this means that when the aggregate default rate 
is above these figures, the banking system tends to be more sensitive to macroeconomic 
turbulences. In a macro prudential perspective, this advises supervisory authorities to 
reinforce monitoring activities in these periods.  
                                                 
11 A negative coefficient on the output gap means that during recessionary conditions (i.e. when the 
output gap is negative) banks’ riskiness increases. 
12 Using quantiles as the thresholds might be an alternative to our approach. However, our 
methodology has the significant advantage of determining the threshold endogenously, without imposing 
any a priori assumption on its value. 
13 To check the robustness of our results we estimated the same models with different proxies of the 
business cycle and more lags for the threshold variable. Our results (not reported for the sake of brevity) 
are not affected by the choice of a longer lag for the threshold variable and are robust to the use of 
different proxies for the business cycle (GAPHP and GDP growth).   
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With model 4, we try to assess whether the impact of the business cycle on 
Italian banks is also subject to a second kind of regime switch, which depends on the 
phase of the business cycle itself. Our results suggest that in recessions the impact of the 
business cycle on credit risk is statistically significant and more pronounced than in 
expansionary phases when the impact is less intense and insignificant. Again, these 
results are generally robust to the use of different business cycle indicators.  
 
3.3. Different Bank Categories 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the models at 
different levels of aggregation. In particular, we classify banks into three different 
institutional categories (limited companies, cooperative banks and mutual banks) that 
present different risk-levels. As a matter of fact, mutual and cooperative banks have a 
lower riskiness than limited companies while mutual banks have the lowest riskiness 
compared to the other two institutional categories. This may be related to the fact that 
mutual and cooperative banks operate more locally than limited banks, thus having a 
better knowledge of their borrowers’ creditworthiness. Table 3 shows that the 
econometric results are substantially unchanged with respect to those presented above 
for the aggregate case.  
The impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk is negative and 
statistically significant when the quality of banks’ portfolios is lower, while it is not 
significant when portfolios are less risky. β11 is significant at the 10 per cent level for 
limited banks; however, its magnitude is considerably lower than that of  12 β . The LR   
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tests reject the null of no regime switch at any conventional level. The estimated 
thresholds are very close across the three categories and similar to those obtained with 
the aggregate models. When GAPT is the threshold variable, the results for models 4, 8 
and 12 confirm that the relationship between the business cycle and credit risk is 
significantly negative only during recessions.  
The results presented so far are very supportive of the hypothesis that credit risk 
is cyclical. However, they also seem to suggest that the issue of cyclicality, as described 
hitherto by the empirical literature, has been somehow misinterpreted. Indeed, 
according to our evidence, the negative relationship between banks’ portfolio riskiness 
and the business cycle holds only in either unfavorable economic conditions or when 
average credit quality is already unsatisfactory. By contrast, it does not seem to be 
statistically significant in good times (i.e., when either economic conditions improve or 
loan riskiness is low).  
However, the small sample size leads us to interpret these preliminary results at 
the aggregate level with some caution and to deepen our analysis, exploiting the cross-
sectional dimension of our rich dataset to account for banks’ heterogeneity.  
 
4.  Panel Data model with a Single Threshold Variable and Multiple Regimes 
Using the detailed information on borrowers’ default rates available on a bank-
by-bank basis and panel data techniques, we can analyze whether the impact of the 
business cycle on riskier and less-risky banks is asymmetric. At a first glance, we expect 
riskier banks to have more cyclical portfolios than less-risky ones. The sample size 
(more than fifteen years of quarterly data at the individual level) allows us to exploit a   
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more articulated econometric representation, with multiple thresholds over the same 
variable. 
 
4.1. The Model 
As in Hansen (1999) we start assuming that the observed data are from a 
balanced panel { } ,, it it it dr x q  with 1 iN ≤ ≤  and 1 tT ≤ ≤ . The scalar  it dr  is the 
dependent variable, the k vector  it x  contains the exogenous (or predetermined 
variables), while  it q  is an s vector ( ) 1 s ≥  containing the threshold variables. The 
subscript i indicates the individual bank, while t designates the time period (in our case 
the quarter). 
The simplest version of the model is a static panel data model with two regimes 
  () ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
23 23
12 3 4 5 6
71 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
ln ln ln lgr lgr lgr
ln lgr
it i it it it it it it
it it t it t it t
dr TA TA TA
TA GAP I dr GAP I dr e
μα α α α α α
αβ γ β γ −−
=+ + + + + +
+⋅ + ≤ + > +
 (10) 
where  i μ  are individual fixed effects,  ( ) ln it TA  and lgrit are the log of total assets and 
the loan growth rate of bank i at time t, respectively, while  ( ) I ⋅  is the indicator 
function. The logarithm of total assets is included to control for banks’ size, while loan 
growth rate controls for different lending policies. Following Hansen (1999), the non-
linear terms are included to reduce the possibility of spurious correlations due to 
omitted variable bias.
14  
                                                 
14 Lack of bank data at higher frequencies does not allow the estimation of models with a richer set of 
bank-specific variables.   
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In model (10) the observations are divided into two regimes depending on whether the 
default rate of bank i at time t is smaller or larger than the threshold  1 γ . This threshold 
is endogenously determined by the model and separates banks with less and more 
cyclical portfolios. Each regime is characterized by different regression slopes  1j β , 
1, 2 j =  and to identify them it is required that both the regressors and the threshold 
variables are not time invariant. The errors  it e  are assumed to be iid with zero mean and 
finite variance 
2 σ . The asymptotic analysis is performed with fixed T and  N →∞. 
Model (10) can be generalized in two ways. Firstly, as we did in equation (3), 
we can identify different business cycle regimes by using a measure of output gap as the 
threshold variable, i.e. 
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
23 23
1234 5 6
71 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
ln ln ln lgr lgr lgr
ln lgr
it i it it it it it it
it it t t t t t
dr TA TA TA
TA GAP I GAP GAP I GAP e
μα α α α α α
αβ γ β γ −− −−
=+ + + + + +
+ + ≤+ >+
 (11) 
In this way, the first regime is characterized by recessionary conditions, while in the 
second one we have booming conditions (the output gap is greater than a certain 
threshold,  1 γ ). Secondly, we can generalize model (10) by considering the possibility of 
more than two regimes over the same threshold variable. For example we can consider 
three regimes over the banks’ riskiness indicator (that is slightly risky, risky and very 
risky banks) with the following model 
 
() () ()
() ( ) ( )
()
23 23
12 3 4 5 6
71 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
13 1 2
ln ln ln lgr lgr lgr
ln lgr
it i it it it it it it
it it t it t it
ti t t
dr TA TA TA
TA GAP I dr GAP I dr
GAP I dr e
μα α α α α α




=+ + + + + +
+⋅ + ≤ + < ≤
+> +
 (12) 
where  12 γ γ < .   
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We can further generalize the model by including a third threshold, so that we 
can characterize four credit risk regimes. The same strategy can be adopted for model 
(11) with different business cycle regimes. 
A more compact way to represent models (10), (11) and their generalizations is 
  ( ) ' it i it it dr x e μθ γ = ++  (13) 
where  () 17 1 1 1 2 ,..., , , ,... θα α β β =  and 
  ( ) ()() () () ( ) ( ) ()
23 23
11 ln ,ln ,ln ,lgr ,lgr ,lgr ,lgr ln , , '
it it it it it it it it it t it t it x TA TA TA TA GAP I dr GAP I dr γ γγ =⋅ ⋅ ≤ ⋅ >
   (14) 
in case of model (10). To estimate this class of models we can employ a fixed effects 
transformation by removing the individual effects. We can take the averages over time 
of (13) getting 
  ()
___




i it t dr T dr
− = ∑ , 
1
ii t t eT e
− = ∑  and  ( ) ( )
1
ii t t xT x γ γ
− = ∑ . Taking the 
differences between (13) and (15) yields  
  ( )




i it it dr dr dr =−,  () ( ) ( )
*
it it i xxx γγ γ =−  and 
*
it it i eee = − . Stacking data and errors 
for each individual i with the first time period deleted and then stacking what results 
over individuals we get the vector of the dependent variable 
* Y , the independent 
variables  ()
* X γ  and that of the errors 
* e . With this notation, (13) is equivalent to 
  ( )
** * YX e γθ = +  (17)   
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and for any given value of the threshold γ  this model can be estimated by OLS, i.e. 
  () () () ()
1 '' ** ** ˆ X XX Y θγ γ γ γ
−
⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  (18) 
with regression residuals  () ( ) ( )
** * ˆ ˆ eY X γ γθγ =−  and sum of squared errors (SSE) 
  () () () () () () ()
1 '' ' ** * ' * * * * * ˆˆ Se e Y I XXX XY γγ γ γγ γ γ
− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ == − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (19) 
Chan (1993) and Hansen (1999) recommend to estimate γ  by LS minimizing 
the concentrated SSE in (19). Thus the LS estimator of γ  becomes 






=  (20) 
Since it is undesirable for a threshold  ˆ γ  to be selected when it sorts too few 
observations in one regime, we can exclude this by restricting the minimization in (20) 
to values of γ  such that a minimal percentage of observations (e.g. 1 or 5%) lie in each 
regime. Once  ˆ γ  is obtained the slope estimate becomes  ( ) ˆˆ ˆ θ θγ = , the residual vector is 
()
** ˆ ˆˆ ee γ =  and the residual variance is  () ()( )
11 2* ' * ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 11 nT ee nT S σ γ
−−
=− =− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . 
Since the SSE  () S γ  depends on the threshold only through the indicator functions, the 
SSE is a step function with at most NT steps. The minimization in (20) can thus be 
reduced to a search over at most NT different values of the threshold variable. This is 
achieved by sorting the threshold eliminating the smallest and the largest δ % to ensure 
a minimum number of observations in each regime. However, since this procedure 
might be numerically intensive with long time spans and large panels, Hansen (1999)   
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suggests using 393 quantiles, reducing the grid search over 
{ } 1.00%,1.25%,1.50%,...,98.75%,99.00% .
15 
As in the aggregate case, it is important to test whether the models in (10) and 
(11) are statistically significant relative to their linear specifications in which there are 
no thresholds. The relevant null hypothesis of no threshold (or one regime) can be 
represented as  01 1 1 2 : H β β = . Again, under the null the thresholds γ ’s are not identified 
(‘Davies’ problem’), implying that classical tests have non-standard distributions. We 
again adopt the bootstrap procedure suggested by Hansen (1996, 1999) to simulate the 
asymptotic distribution of the test under the null hypothesis of no thresholds. Under the 
null, the model can be compactly represented as 
 ' it i it it dr x e μ θ = ++  (21) 
or as in (16) under the fixed effects transformation. The regression parameter θ  can be 
estimated by OLS, yielding the restricted estimate θ % , residuals 
*
it e %  and sum of squared 
errors 
*' *
0 it it Se e = %%. Thus, the likelihood ratio test of  0 H  against the alternative of a 
threshold is based on  









=  (22) 
where  () ( )
1 2
11 ˆ ˆ 1 nT S σ γ
−
=− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . 
                                                 
15 In our four-regime models we adopt a different approach from Hansen (1999) to estimate the 
thresholds. Instead of estimating the third threshold keeping the first two fixed, we continue with another 
full sequence of estimations. Once the third threshold is estimated, we estimate the first one keeping the 
second and third one fixed. We then fix the first and the third to estimate the second one. Finally we 
estimate the third one, keeping the first two thresholds fixed. This procedure consistently estimates all the 
thresholds in case of more than three regimes. For other details on the estimation of these models, see 
Hansen (1999) and Marcucci and Lotti (2007).   
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We can get asymptotically valid tests by using the bootstrap. Keeping the 
regressors and threshold variable fixed in repeated bootstrap samples, we adopt the 
following procedure. First we estimate the model grouping the regression residuals 
*
it e %  
by individual, i.e. for each i we construct  ( )
** *
1,, ii i T ee e = %% % K  treating the sample 
{ }
** *
1,, N ee e = %% % K  as the empirical distribution for the bootstrap. Then we draw with 
replacement a sample of size N  from the empirical distribution and use these errors 
*( ) b e % , where the superscript indicates the b-th bootstrap replication, to create a bootstrap 
sample under the null, i.e. 
*( ) * *( ) '
bb
it it it dr x e θ =+ % % % . Using the bootstrap sample 
*( ) b
it dr % , we 
estimate the model under the null, i.e. 
( ) * * '
b






it it it dr x v θγ =+ . Therefore, we compute the bootstrap value of the 
likelihood ratio statistic  10 F  as in (22), repeating this procedure a large number (say B ) 
of times. We finally calculate the bootstrap p-value as the percentage of draws for 
which the simulated statistic exceeds the actual value. 
 
4.2. Empirical Results with the Default Rate as the Threshold Variable: Credit Risk 
Regimes 
The results of the estimated panel data models with two or more regimes over 
the same threshold variable are provided in Table 4. We start with the simple model 1, 
which includes only a single threshold, and move on to models 2 and 3, which include 
two and three thresholds, respectively. The use of multiple thresholds (with the same 
threshold variable) makes it possible to identify up to four regimes (from the least to the   
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most cyclical), in which we classify banks depending on their portfolios’ riskiness (for 
simplicity, from the lowest to the highest threshold, we can refer to them as less risky, 
slightly risky, fairly risky and riskier banks).  
When a single threshold is introduced, we find that both less-risky and riskier 
banks are significantly affected by the business cycle, but the magnitude of the 
coefficient on the business cycle indicator is larger for those banks with lower asset 
quality (i.e., riskier banks are also more cyclical). In particular, the increase of dr as the 
result of 1 percentage point decrease of GAP is almost 9 times higher for riskier banks 
than for less risky ones.  
Models 2 and 3 provide further support to the application of regime-switching 
models for analyzing credit risk. We find that the magnitude of the coefficients on GAP 
monotonically increases as we move from lower-risk to higher-risk intermediaries. In 
particular, looking at the results for model 3, we note that β is equal to -0.02 and -0.11 
for less risky and slightly risky banks, respectively, while such impact jumps to -0.20 
and -0.33 for fairly risky and riskier banks, respectively, which are therefore much more 
cyclical than the previous ones.
16 These are quite substantial differences also 
corroborated by a series of Wald tests which all reject the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients. We note that the first and second thresholds are very stable, since they 
remain unchanged as the number of regimes increases.  
                                                 
16 In model 2, banks in the higher risk regime are affected by the business cycle almost 13 times more 
than those less risky. In model 3, riskier banks are affected by macroeconomic conditions 20 times more 
than the less risky ones. In particular, the impact of the business cycle on the slightly risky banks is seven 
times higher than that for less risky ones, while the impact of fairly risky ones is twice as much higher as 
that for the slightly risky ones. Finally, the effect of economic conditions on riskier banks is twice as high 
as that for fairly risky ones. This monotonicity is shared by all the models we considered.   
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This suggests that the use of multiple regimes is not very helpful for classifying 
less cyclical banks, but it is extremely important for identifying more accurately fragile 
intermediaries. 
This evidence is confirmed when lagged dr is employed as the threshold variable 
(models 5, 6 and 7). Here we can notice that more cyclical banks are already selected 
with the two-regime model (i.e., model 5). As we add further thresholds, we 
discriminate more precisely among less cyclical banks.
17 
For models 1, 2 and 3 the LR test for the null of one, two and three regimes, 
respectively, is significant at any conventional level. This indicates that the model with 
four regimes (three thresholds) is adequate. When we use the lagged dr as the threshold 
variable, the LR tests for the null of one and two regimes are rejected at 5%, while we 
cannot reject the null of three regimes.   
The endogenously determined thresholds can be used to assess the evolution of 
the Italian banks’ riskiness over time. The three charts of panel A in Figure 2 depict the 
percentages of Italian banks in the more cyclical regimes in each quarter for the models 
with two, three and four regimes (models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 4) along with the ISAE 
recessions (shaded areas). We can notice that banks tended to migrate towards more 
cyclical regimes in both the 1992Q2-1993Q2 and the 1995Q4-1996Q3 recessions. 
However, no significant migration is apparent in the 2001Q1-2004Q4 recession, 
notwithstanding the stagnant economic conditions. A possible explanation is that banks 
have improved borrower selection criteria in the last years due to the increasing 
importance of risk management. Furthermore, the very low level of interest rates and   
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the limited level of indebtedness may have helped firms and households to honor their 
obligations even in unfavorable times. Another explanation is the more and more 
important credit risk transfer market, which allows many financial intermediaries to 
transfer credit risk to other institutions/investors through a plethora of new financial 
instruments. All this factors may have alleviated the cyclicality of credit risk. 
We also notice that the share of banks under the fourth regime is almost 
unaffected by the economic environment. This extreme risk-category (dr>1.44%) is 
probably more affected by idiosyncratic factors than systemic ones. 
The three charts of Panel B in Figure 2 show the same percentages as Panel A 
when the lagged default rate is used as the threshold (models 5, 6 and 7 of Table 4). The 
results are quite similar to those already discussed. Notice that using the lagged default 
rate as a threshold allows us to disentangle the same behavior observed in the previous 
panel but now more banks fall in the fourth regime (the one of more cyclical banks). 
Many Italian banks migrated towards more cyclical regimes in both the 1992Q2-
1993Q2 and the 1995Q4-1996Q3 recessions, but no significant migration is evident in 
the 2001Q1-2004Q4 recession for the same reasons explained above. 
In principle, our analysis may be improved including more bank-specific 
variables in the econometric specification. For example, some indicators based on 
banks’ financial statement may help to control the possible causes of cyclicality. 
Unfortunately, lack of data with a sufficient time-span and above all at higher 
frequencies than yearly did not allow us to perform this check.  
                                                                                                                                               
17 As a robustness check, we also estimated the models for different institutional categories of banks. 
The results for these specifications are consistent with those presented above for the whole system and are 
therefore not reported for the sake of brevity.    
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In order to provide some further evidence of heterogeneous bank behavior we 
have analyzed some characteristic of riskier and thus more cyclical banks. In particular, 
we have focused on intermediaries classified as fairly risky and riskier by our model 3 
of Table 4 (four-regime panel data) between 1992 and 2004. These banks are very often 
small banks; on average their market share on either total assets or loans represented 
less than 4 per cent of the whole banking system. Their average solvency ratio is equal, 
on average, to 15%, which is not only much higher than the regulatory minimum but 
also of the other banks’ figures. However, we note that in Italy smaller banks are 
generally better capitalized than larger ones also for regulatory reasons (in particular, 
mutual banks are subject to specific rules concerning profit allocation). Therefore, it is 
difficult to argue that more cyclical banks tend – prudently – to keep higher capital 
buffers than less-cyclical ones. Indeed, the loan-loss provision ratio, which can be 
considered another proxy of a cautious risk management, appears very similar between 
these two categories of banks. 
 
4.3. Empirical Results with the Output Gap as the Threshold Variable: Business 
Cycle Regimes 
When GAPT is used as the threshold variable (model 4 of Table 4), we find 
further evidence that the relationship between credit risk and the business cycle is 
stronger in recessionary conditions rather than in booms. This is consistent with our 
previous results for the aggregate case. Unfortunately, the LR test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of one regime (i.e., no threshold). However, a Wald test on the equality of 
the coefficients  11 β  and  12 β  is rejected at any usual significance level, indicating that   
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the model still captures some of the features of the relationship between credit risk and 
the business cycle in different phases. 
Based on the estimated thresholds for GAPT, we can identify periods in which 
economic conditions tend to affect banks’ portfolios to a larger extent than in normal 
times. In unreported results, we identify four “high-impact” periods: between 1993-Q1 
and 1994-Q2, in 1997-Q1/Q2, 1999-Q1 and 2005-Q2. We note that these periods do not 
necessarily overlap with the ISAE recessionary phases.  
 
4.4. Robustness checks and a Monte Carlo exercise 
As a first step to check the robustness of our results we have estimated both 
panel data models with one threshold variable for different subsamples. First we have 
split our full sample in two subsamples: 1990Q1-1997Q4 and 1998Q1-2005Q2. In the 
first subsample we have almost two complete business cycles, while in the second one 
we have almost one complete cycle. In both subsamples the estimated thresholds 
(unreported) are in line with those estimated for the full sample. In addition, the 
previously found negative relationship between credit risk and the business cycle still 
holds as well as the monotonic relationship between coefficients in different regimes. 
As a further robustness check, we have estimated both models on a sequence of rolling 
five-year subsamples starting from 1990Q1-1994Q4 through 2001Q1-2005Q2. All the 
previous findings are again confirmed. Besides, the estimated thresholds are quite 
consistent in the various subsamples; they are on average close to the full sample 
estimates. For example, for the model with two regimes and drt as the threshold we   
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obtained two high values (around unity) for those subsamples characterized by the 1993 
and 1995 recessions.
18  
Furthermore, we set up a Monte Carlo experiment to check the robustness of our 
models out of sample. We split our sample in two parts. The first one is the in-sample 
one where we select 160 banks. This in-sample part is used to estimate each model. The 
second part is the out-of-sample one where we leave the other 52 banks. This part is 
used to test our model out-of-sample. Since in our full sample of 212 banks we have 73 
limited banks (34%), 18 cooperative banks (9%) and 121 mutual banks (57%), we have 
decided to maintain the same percentages in both the in-sample and out-of-sample parts. 
Therefore, in-sample we have 55 limited banks, 14 cooperative banks and 91 mutual 
banks whereas out-of-sample we have 18 limited banks, 4 cooperative banks and 30 
limited banks. At each iteration we randomly select the 52 banks that remain out-of-
sample. We estimate the model with the 160 banks in-sample, we save both the 
estimated coefficients and thresholds and use them to compute the fitted values of the 
default rate (our dependent variable) for our 52 banks out-of-sample. Since we have the 
realized values of such default rates, we compute two measures of goodness of fit. The 
first one is the difference in absolute value between the fitted values of the default rates 
out-of-sample and their realized values which is called LABS. The second one is the 
squared difference between the fitted values out-of-sample of the default rates and their 
realized values, called LSQ.  
                                                 
18 As a further robustness check we estimated both models including more dynamics in the business 
cycle indicators. We added up to four lags of our business cycle indicator (i.e. GAPT) at each regime in 
each model. We found that almost all coefficients are negative but only the first lag coefficients are 
significant. We also estimated the models considering all the possible quantiles of each threshold variable 
rather than the 393 suggested by Hansen (1999). Unreported results show that using 393 quantiles is 
sufficient to correctly estimate the unknown thresholds. As a further check we estimated our models with 
the default rate at time t-2 as the threshold variable and all the previous results still hold.   
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Table 6 reports the summary results for the Monte Carlo exercises for all models 
estimated in this paper with 1,000 iterations. For each model we present both the 
median and mean value of all the coefficients and thresholds along with the average 
values of the two measures of goodness of fit (LABS and L SQ). For all models of this 
section, both the average and median values of the absolute and squared differences are 
quite small suggesting that these models give a good description of the relationship 
between credit risk and the business cycle both in-sample and out-of-sample. These 
findings also suggest that these models can be adopted to carry out real out-of-sample 
exercises. All the regime-dependent coefficients both on average and in median terms 
are close to the estimated values for our full sample. Furthermore, the mean and median 
thresholds are consistent with the estimates obtained with the full sample for all models 
with one threshold variable and two or more regimes.  
 
5.  Combining Credit Risk and Business cycle: panel data model with two 
threshold variables and four regimes  
5.1. The Model 
As an extension of Hansen’s (1999) model, we can use a four-regime panel data 
model where the regimes are determined by two different threshold variables, as 
suggested by Marcucci and Lotti (2007). The simplest version of the model takes the 
form   
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(23) 
where  i μ  are individual fixed effects,  ( ) ln it TA  and lgrit are the log of total assets and 
the loan growth rate of bank i at time t, respectively, while  ( ) I ⋅  is the indicator 
function. 
In model (23) the observations are divided into four regimes depending on both 
the default rate of each bank and the output gap. With this model we can study less risky  
and riskier banks in both booming and recessionary conditions. In this way we can look 
at their different behavior over different phases of the business cycle. As before, each 
regime is characterized by different slopes ( 1 , 1,...,4 j j β = ) and to identify them it is 
required that both the regressors and threshold variables are not time invariant. The 
errors are assumed to be iid with zero mean and finite variance while the asymptotic 
analysis is again performed with fixed T and  N →∞. 
To estimate this model we can employ the fixed effects transformation as with 
the two-regime panel data model discussed before. We can then apply conditional LS 
minimizing the concentrated SSE as in (20). As before, it is fundamental to test whether 
the model (23) is statistically significant relative to the simplest models with only one 
threshold. The null hypothesis in this case is that of one threshold. Thus, we again have 
the problem of some parameters not identified under the null, implying a non-standard 
testing problem. We can therefore adopt the bootstrap procedure suggested by Marcucci 
and Lotti (2007) which is similar to that one discussed before in the case of only one   
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threshold. An approximate likelihood ratio test of one threshold against two thresholds 
can be based on the statistic 












where  () ( )
1 2
21 2 ˆˆ ˆ 1, nT S σ γγ
−
=− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . The null hypothesis of one threshold is rejected for 
large values of  21 F . We can use a similar bootstrap procedure as in the two-regime 
panel data model to obtain the approximate asymptotic distribution of the test. To 
generate the bootstrap samples we hold both the regressors and thresholds fixed in 
repeated bootstrap samples. Then we follow the same steps discussed before to obtain 
the bootstrap p-value of the test. 
 
5.2. Empirical Results 
The final set of results is obtained estimating a model with two different 
threshold variables: the micro variable dr and the business cycle indicator (GAPT). In 
this way, we try to depict a more comprehensive picture of the evolution of credit risk 
across banks and through the business cycle. It is not straightforward to guess the 
impact of the business cycle conditions on banks with different portfolios. However, our 
a priori belief is that less risky banks should be less affected by the overall economic 
conditions than riskier ones. In other words, less risky banks should be less cyclical, 
while riskier banks should be more cyclical. In addition, as suggested by our previous 
results, for the latter intermediaries, the impact should be stronger in unfavorable times.   
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Table 5 shows the results for the four-regime panel data models with two 
different threshold variables. In model 1, where the thresholds are  it dr  and  1 t GAPT − , we 
notice that the coefficient on GAP is negative, as expected, only for less-risky banks in 
expansionary periods and for riskier banks during recessions. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is higher for riskier banks (a ratio of about 3), confirming the results we 
provided in the previous paragraphs. However, it is puzzling that the coefficient turns 
out to be positive and statistically significant for less risky banks in recession and riskier 
banks in expansion. Since we suspect that contemporaneous drit  may suffer some 
endogeneity problems, we also estimate the four-regime panel data model with the 
lagged default rate and GAPT as the threshold variables.   
With model 2 where the lagged default rate is used as the threshold we have 
more clear-cut results. In fact, all the  1j β ,  1,...,4 j =  coefficients are negative and 
significant. In addition, the monotonic relationships we previously found, both between 
less risky and riskier banks and between recessionary and expansionary phases, are all 
confirmed. Riskier banks are affected by the business cycle during recessions more than 
four times as much as the same type of banks in expansion. In addition the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on riskier banks in recessionary phases is more than three 
times as much as that on less risky banks. Finally, less risky banks are also affected by 
the business cycle during recessions almost twice as much as similar banks are affected 
in booming phases.
19 
                                                 
19 Models 3, 4 and 5 are the same as model 1 for limited, cooperative and mutual banks respectively. 
The results we obtain are quite similar to the previous ones for the whole sample with some counter-
intuitive evidence. In particular, the coefficients for less risky banks in recession and those for riskier 
banks in expansion are positive and significant. This is less evident from the estimates of models 6, 7 and 
8 that are the same as model 2 but for limited, cooperative and mutual banks respectively. Here, only the 
coefficients for riskier banks in expansion are slightly significant and positive both for limited and 
cooperative banks except for mutual ones. However, the same picture found both at the aggregate level   
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In the last two columns of Table 6 we present the mean and median results of 
our out-of-sample Monte Carlo exercise described in Section IV for the two four-regime 
models with two different threshold variables. In both cases, the average and median 
estimated thresholds are close to those obtained for the full sample. In addition, the 
regime-dependent estimates are similar to those obtained from the full sample thus 
further corroborating our conclusions.
20 
These results can be extremely helpful for supervisory authorities in monitoring 
credit risk during different phases of the business cycle. However, further research is 
needed to ameliorate and calibrate these regime-switching models based on panel data 
and threshold regression.  
 
6.   Concluding remarks 
In this paper we try to make a step forward in explaining the macroeconomic 
determinants of credit risk and its evolution over the business cycle. With respect to 
most of the existing studies, which neglect asymmetric effects, we analyze whether the 
relationship between the business cycle and credit risk is subject to regime switches 
determining endogenously the thresholds at which the model switches from one regime 
to the other.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
and at the individual level with simpler models still holds. We keep on having monotonicity and higher 
impacts both for riskier banks and during recessions. 
20 We also estimated these four-regime models with two different threshold variables in two 
subsamples: the first one is 1990Q1—1997Q4 and the second one is 1998Q1—2005Q2 obtaining similar 
results to the full sample.   
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Using a threshold regression approach combined with panel data and exploiting 
a unique dataset on Italian bank borrowers’ default rates, we find that the impact of the 
business cycle is more pronounced when credit risk levels are higher and during 
unfavorable economic times. Moreover, our methodology allows us to identify the risk 
threshold(s) over/below which such impact is different, providing a powerful tool for 
financial stability monitoring.  
As an example, in the two-regime panel threshold model, we find that both less-
risky and riskier banks are significantly affected by the business cycle, but the impact is 
stronger for the latter. In particular, the increase of the default rate as a result of one 
percentage point decrease of the output gap is almost 9 times higher for riskier banks. 
This evidence is robust to the use of different proxies for the overall economic 
conditions and holds at various levels of aggregation. In addition, we find a certain 
degree of monotonicity in the impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk that is 
higher for riskier banks as well as during recessions. 
By contrast, the evidence arising from our panel data model with two different 
threshold variables and four regimes is slightly less definite and leaves room for future 
research. Also, it may be valuable to test the out-of-sample performance of this kind of 
models as soon as longer time-series become available.  
Overall, our results may provide some guidance to banks and supervisors in the 
assessment of capital buffers in the various phases of the business cycle, particularly 
under risk sensitive capital requirements. Furthermore, the methodology we propose 
may be easily employed by supervisors for selecting more cyclical institutions and for 
stress testing credit risk in banks’ books.   
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This table provides the summary statistics for the default rate dr, both at the bank and aggregate level, the total assets in logs, ln(TA), the individual loan growth 
rate, lgr, the quarterly growth rate of GDP, GDPG, the output gap computed as the difference between the GDP and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered series, 
GAPHP, and the output gap computed as the difference between the GDP and a linear trend, GAPT. All data are quarterly from 1990:Q1 to 2005:Q2 for a total of 
13,144 bank-quarters (212 banks and 62 quarters, balanced panel). The default rate is computed as the flow of new 'adjusted' bad debts in each quarter over the 
outstanding non-performing loans in the previous quarter. Total assets are in million of euros. The loan growth rate is the difference between the loan growth rate 
of each bank i at time t and the average loan growth rate for each quarter.  
 
Description Min 25% Percentile Median 75% Percentile Max Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
dr it Individual default rate 0.000 0.000 0.257 0.453 1.495 0.299 0.281 1.048 4.066
ln(TA it) Total Assets in logs 1.792 5.011 5.964 7.279 12.304 6.252 1.738 0.697 3.320
lgr it Loan growth rate -0.295 -0.028 -0.011 0.006 0.272 -0.010 0.036 0.599 10.193
dr t Aggregate default rate 0.309 0.379 0.539 0.671 0.972 0.554 0.179 0.498 2.361
GDPG t GDP growth rate -1.840 0.402 1.169 2.528 3.818 1.363 1.338 -0.115 2.368
GAPHP t
Output gap from HP-
filtered GDP
-2.126 -0.513 0.116 0.639 1.779 0.017 0.829 -0.313 2.588
GAPT t
Output gap from linear 
trend
-3.001 -0.734 0.168 0.920 2.539 -0.037 1.298 -0.222 2.316
Micro variables
Macro variables
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Table 2 
Estimates for 2-regime threshold model at the aggregate level 
 
This table presents the conditional LS estimates for the following threshold models with 2 regimes:  
Model (1): 
01 11 1 tt t dr GAP e ββ
− =+ +  
Model (2):  () { } ( ) { } 01 11 1 02 12 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e ββ γ ββ γ
−− =+ ≤ ++ > +  
Model (3):  () { } ( ) { } 01 11 1 1 02 12 1 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e ββ γ ββ γ
−− −− =+ ≤ ++ > +  
Model (4):  () { } ( ) { } 01 11 1 1 02 12 1 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I GAP GAP I GAP e ββ γ ββ γ
−− −− =+ ≤ ++ > +  
where dr is the aggregate default rate and GAPt-1 is GAPTt-1. γ  is the estimated threshold, N1 and N2 are the 
number of observations that lie in the first and second regime, respectively. LR is the likelihood ratio test 
for the null of no threshold whose p-value is computed through the bootstrap as suggested by Hansen 
(1996). N. bootstrap is the number of bootstrap replications used to compute the p-value. The trimming % 
is the percentage of observations that are excluded from the sample so that a minimal percentage of 
observations lie in each regime. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 
5 and 10% respectively. 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.5536 *** 0.4022 *** 0.4074 *** 0.4449 ***
(0.0226) (0.0127) (0.0151) (0.0259)
-0 . 7 1 1 8 *** 0.7020 *** 0.5559 ***
- (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0653)
-0.0752 ** -0.0210 1.50E-05 -0.2183 ***
(0.0303) (0.0161) (0.0277) (0.0356)
- -0.0676 *** -0.0747 *** -0.0084
- (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0776)
-0 . 5 3 8 7 ** 0.5793 ** 0.3005 **
0.1171 0.8214 0.7638 0.3200
58 30 30 36
- 2 82 82 2
LR Test -4 4 . 5 9 *** 40.00 *** 13.02 ***
p-value - 0.000 0.000 0.001
N. bootstrap - 1000 1000 1000
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Table 3 
Estimates for 2-regime threshold model at the aggregate level for bank categories 
 
This table reports the conditional LS estimates for the following threshold models with 2 regimes: 
 
Models (1), (5) and (9): 
01 11 1 tt t dr GAP e ββ
− =+ + , for limited, cooperative and mutual banks respectively. 
Models (2), (6) and (10):  () { } ( ) { } 01 11 1 02 12 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e ββ γ ββ γ
−− =+ ≤ ++ > +  for limited, cooperative and mutual banks respectively, 
Models (3), (7) and (11):  () { } ( ) { } 01 11 1 1 02 12 1 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e ββ γ ββ γ
−− −− =+ ≤ ++ > + , for limited, cooperative and mutual banks respectively, 
Models (4), (8) and (12):  () { } ( ) { } 01 11 1 1 02 12 1 1 tt t t t t dr GAP I GAP GAP I GAP e ββ γ ββ γ
−− −− =+ ≤ ++ > + , for limited, cooperative and mutual banks respectively, 
 
where dr is the aggregate default rate and GAPt-1 is GAPTt-1. The threshold default rate is the overall default rate for all models, while the dependent variable refers the default rate 
of each bank category. γ  is the estimated threshold, N1 and N2 are the number of observations that lie in the first and second regime, respectively. LR is the likelihood ratio test for 
the null of no threshold whose p-value is computed through the bootstrap as suggested by Hansen (1996) with N. bootstrap replications. The trimming % is the percentage of 
observations that are excluded from the sample so that a minimal percentage of observations lie in each regime. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.5765 *** 0.4206 *** 0.4257 *** 0.4685 *** 0.4894 *** 0.3603 *** 0.3589 *** 0.3998 *** 0.3661 *** 0.2930 *** 0.2756 *** 0.3023 ***
(0.0228) (0.0130) (0.0154) (0.0265) (0.0198) (0.0090) (0.0085) (0.0224) (0.0142) (0.0083) (0.0068) (0.0144)
- 0.7284 *** 0.7193 *** 0.5825 *** - 0.6217 *** 0.6215 *** 0.5071 *** - 0.4921 *** 0.4586 *** 0.3304 ***
- (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0674) - (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0540) - (0.0104) (0.0136) (0.0420)
-0.0780 ** -0.0223 -0.0018 * -0.2198 *** -0.0725 *** -0.0084 -0.0042 -0.1888 *** -0.0482 ** -0.0194 -0.0053 -0.1356 ***
(0.0304) (0.0174) (0.0283) (0.0371) (0.0276) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0363) (0.0205) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0225)
- -0.0723 *** -0.0791 *** -0.0157 - -0.0742 *** -0.0726 ** -0.0354 - -0.0517 *** -0.0460 *** 0.0329
- (0.0205) (0.0217) (0.0799) - (0.0219) (0.0222) (0.0658) - (0.0098) (0.0160) (0.0519)
- 0.5369 ** 0.5387 ** 0.3005 ** - 0.5387 ** 0.5793 ** 0.3005 ** - 0.6191 ** 0.5793 ** 0.3005 **
0.1227 0.8025 0.7501 0.3168 0.1375 0.7846 0.7880 0.3079 0.1216 0.8210 0.7473 0.3199
58 29 29 36 58 30 30 36 58 37 30 36
- 29 29 22 - 28 28 22 - 21 28 22
LR Test - 43.76 *** 39.12 *** 12.83 *** - 42.83 *** 42.21 *** 11.83 *** - 41.92 *** 38.08 *** 12.22 ***
p-value - 0.000 0.000 0.001 - 0.000 0.000 0.008 - 0.000 0.000 0.008
N. bootstrap - 1000 1000 1000 - 1000 1000 1000 - 1000 1000 1000
trimming % - 0.15 0.15 0.15 - 0.15 0.15 0.15 - 0.15 0.15 0.15
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Table 4 
Estimates for threshold regression panel data models with 2 or more regimes over 
the same threshold variable 
 
This table displays the conditional LS estimates for the following threshold panel data model with 2 or more regimes 
(same threshold variable): 
Model (1):  () () () ( )
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it dr TA TA TA GAP I dr α αα α α α β γ
− =+ + + + + + ≤  
  ()
12 1 1 ti t t GAP I dr e βγ
− +> +  
Model (2):  () () () ( )
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it dr TA TA TA GAP I dr α αα α α α β γ
− =+ + + + + + ≤  
  ()( )
12 1 1 2 13 1 2 ti t t i t t GAP I dr GAP I dr e βγ γ β γ
−− + <≤+ >+  
Model (3):  () () () ( )
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it dr TA TA TA GAP I dr α αα α α α β γ
− =+ + + + + + ≤  
  ()( ) ( )
12 1 1 2 13 1 2 3 14 1 3 ti t t i t t i t t GAP I dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e βγ γ βγγ β γ
−−− +< ≤ + < ≤ + > +  
Model (4): () () () ( )
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t t dr TA TA TA GAP I GAP α αα α α α β γ
−− =+ + + + + + ≤  
  ()
12 1 1 1 tt t GAP I GAP e βγ
−− +> +  
Model (5), (6) and (7): same as (1), (2) and (3) respectively with threshold 
it dr  replaced by 
1 it dr
−  
where dr is the individual default rate and GAPt-1 is GAPTt-1.  ,1 , 2 , 3 j j γ =  are the estimated thresholds. LR is the 
likelihood ratio test for i) the null of no threshold in models (1), (4) and (5), ii) the null of one threshold in models (2) 
and (6), and iii) the null of two thresholds for models (3) and (7). Its p-value is computed through the bootstrap as 
suggested by Hansen (1996) with N. bootstrap replications. The trimming % is the percentage of observations that are 
excluded from the sample so that a minimal percentage of observations lie in each regime. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.1493 *** 0.1503 *** 0.1505 *** 0.1833 *** 0.1633 *** 0.1654 *** 0.1651 ***
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186)
-0.0204 *** -0.0205 *** -0.0205 *** -0.0234 *** -0.0219 *** -0.0221 *** -0.0220 ***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
-0.6173 *** -0.6199 *** -0.6227 *** -0.6265 *** -0.6089 *** -0.6003 *** -0.6073 ***
(0.1840) (0.1837) (0.1837) (0.1870) (0.1862) (0.1860) (0.1861)
-0.1134 ** -0.1083 ** -0.1089 ** -0.1118 ** -0.1238 *** -0.1183 ** -0.1188 **
(0.0447) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0466) (0.0463) (0.0461) (0.0462)
0.1927 *** 0.1912 *** 0.1910 *** 0.2115 *** 0.2072 *** 0.2038 *** 0.2034 ***
(0.0286) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0302) (0.0299) (0.0297) (0.0298)
-0.0531 ** -0.0523 ** -0.0518 ** -0.0621 ** -0.0648 ** -0.0650 ** -0.0634 **
(0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0273) (0.0271) (0.0270) (0.0270)
-0.0170 *** -0.0165 *** -0.0165 *** -0.0513 *** -0.0241 *** -0.0181 *** -0.0181 ***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021)
-0.1484 *** -0.1111 *** -0.1110 *** -0.0210 *** -0.0878 *** -0.0340 *** -0.0289 ***
(0.0093) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0019) (0.0058) (0.0028) (0.0034)
- -0.2091 *** -0.2000 *** - - -0.0878 *** -0.0421 ***
(0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0058) (0.0047)
- - -0.3305 *** - - - -0.0878
(0.0804) (0.0058)
0.735 ** 0.721 ** 0.721 ** -1.822 ** 0.743 ** 0.317 ** 0.317 **
-0 . 9 8 8 ** 0.988 ** - - 0.743 ** 0.513 **
-- 1 . 4 3 7 ** - - - 0.743 **
N. of banks 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
N. of quarters 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
N. of quantiles 393 393 393 393 393 393 393
Trimming % 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
LR Test 1099.92 *** 95.20 *** 18.83 *** 474.70 561.93 ** 21.55 ** 5.73
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.390 0.020 0.015 0.695
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Figure 1 
Italian business cycle indicators. 
 
This figure depicts the Italian business cycle as measured by three different indicators. GAPHP (left-hand scale) is the 
real GDP minus the HP-filtered GDP series. GAPT ((left-hand scale)) is the GDP minus the potential output proxied by 
a fitted linear trend. GDPG (right-hand scale) is the series of the GDP q/q growth rate. Shaded areas indicate the 



















Percentage of banks in each regime by quarter (Threshold panel data model with 2 or more 
regimes). 
 
This figure displays the percentage of the 212 banks that fall in the more cyclical regimes within the 
threshold panel data model with 2 or more regimes (see Table 4). Panel A depicts the percentage of banks 
in the second regime, the second and the third regimes and the second, the third and the fourth regimes, 
respectively from left to right, when the threshold variable is the contemporaneous default rate. For 
example, in model (1) the first chart on the left of panel A shows the percentage of banks for which 
1 it dr γ > .Panel B displays the same charts for models where the threshold variable is the lagged default 
rate. For example, in model (5) the first chart on the left of panel A shows the percentage of banks for 
which 
11 it dr γ
− > . 
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Table 5 
Estimates for threshold regression panel data models with 4 regimes over different threshold variables 
 
This table presents the conditional LS estimates for the following threshold panel data model with 4 regimes (different threshold variable: one micro and one macro): 
 
Model (1):  () () () () () () ()
2 23
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 11 1 2 1 2 11 1 2 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it t t it t dr TA TA TA GAP I dr I GAP GAP I dr I GAP α αα α α α β γ γ β γ γ
−− −− =+ + + + + + ≤ ≤ + ≤ >  
  () () ( ) ()
13 1 1 1 2 14 1 1 1 2 ti t t ti t t t G A P Id r IG A P G A P Id r IG A P e βγ γ βγ γ
−− −− + >≤ + >> +  
Model (2):  () () () () () () ()
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it t t it t dr TA TA TA GAP I dr I GAP GAP I dr I GAP α αα α α α β γ γ β γ γ
−− − −− − =+ + + + + + ≤ ≤ + ≤ >  
  () () ( ) ()
13 1 1 1 1 2 14 1 1 1 1 2 ti t t ti t t t GAP I dr I GAP GAP I dr I GAP e βγ γ βγ γ
−− − −− − + >≤ + >> +  
Model (3), (4) and (5): same as (1) with 
it dr  replaced by 
LTD
it dr , 
CO
it dr  and 
MU
it dr  respectively. Model (6), (7) and (8): same as (2) with 
1 it dr












−  respectively, 
where dr is the individual default rate and GAPt-1 is GAPTt-1.  1 γ  and  2 γ  are the estimated micro and macro threshold, respectively. LR is the likelihood ratio test for the null of one micro 
threshold whose p-value is computed through the bootstrap as suggested by Hansen (1996) with N. bootstrap replications. The trimming % is the percentage of observations that are 
excluded from the sample so that a minimal percentage of observations lie in each regime. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0496 *** 0.1656 *** 0.0556 ** 0.1803 *** 0.0072 0.0995 *** 0.2576 *** 0.1662 ***
(0.0147) (0.0186) (0.0240) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0299) (0.0233) (0.0287)
-0.0066 *** -0.0216 *** -0.0097 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0017 -0.0179 *** -0.0235 *** -0.0216 ***
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0027)
-0.4834 *** -0.6327 *** -1.5294 *** -1.8760 *** -0.2234 -1.8381 *** -2.4589 *** 0.0520
(0.1419) (0.1861) (0.3030) (0.2502) (0.1608) (0.3622) (0.3184) (0.2171)
-0.1002 *** -0.1045 ** -0.0416 -0.0900 ** -0.1699 *** -0.0102 -0.0187 -0.1542 ***
(0.0355) (0.0460) (0.0383) (0.0363) (0.0303) (0.0446) (0.0419) (0.0401)
0.1198 *** 0.2078 *** 0.2120 *** 0.0650 *** 0.0936 *** 0.2810 *** 0.1868 *** 0.1664 ***
(0.0205) (0.0296) (0.0253) (0.0236) (0.0156) (0.0305) (0.0277) (0.0220)
-0.0215 -0.0590 ** 0.0864 ** 0.1610 *** -0.0522 0.0830 * 0.1780 *** -0.1889 ***
(0.0221) (0.0271) (0.0366) (0.0291) (0.0329) (0.0426) (0.0369) (0.0425)
        (good bank/recession) 0.0522 *** -0.0333 *** 0.0439 *** 0.0240 *** 0.0558 *** -0.0152 *** -0.0315 ** -0.0224 ***
(0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0045)
        (good bank/expansion) -0.0688 *** -0.0187 *** -0.0707 *** -0.0532 *** -0.0696 *** -0.0336 *** -0.0176 *** -0.0131 ***
(0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0023)
        (bad bank/recession) -0.2046 *** -0.1130 *** -0.1750 *** -0.1906 *** -0.2344 *** -0.1092 *** -0.1903 *** -0.0578 ***
(0.0043) (0.0067) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0056) (0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0061)
        (bad bank/expansion) 0.2289 *** -0.0263 *** 0.1648 *** 0.1679 *** 0.2942 *** 0.0116 * 0.0341 * -0.0147 ***
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.44 0.729 0.508 0.561 0.372 0.546 0.888 0.324
-0.178 -1.614 -0.178 -0.178 -0.178 -0.219 -0.782 -1.822
N. of banks 212 212 73 18 121 73 18 121
N. of quarters 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
N. of quantiles (micro) 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393
N. of quantiles (macro) 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Trimming % 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
LR Test 7000.58 *** 78.54 *** 5601.92 *** 5497.42 *** 9494.10 *** 274.64 *** 308.69 *** 40.90 ***
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 6 
Summary Results of Monte Carlo Exercises 
 
This table reports the summary results for the Monte Carlo out-of-sample exercises for all models estimated in this paper. The models are the following: 
 
Model (1):  () () () ( ) ( )
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it t it t dr TA TA TA GAP I dr GAP I dr e αα α α α α β γ β γ
−− = ++ + + + + ≤ + > + . Model (2) is the same as model (1) with 
it dr  replaced by 
1 it dr
− . 
Model (3): () () () ( ) ( )
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t t t t t dr TA TA TA GAP I GAP GAP I GAP e αα α α α α β γ β γ
−− −− = ++ + + + + ≤ + > + .  
Model (4):  () () () ( ) ( ) ( )
2 23
1 2 3 4 5 6 11 1 1 12 1 1 2 13 1 2 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it t it t it t dr TA TA TA GAP I dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e αα α α α α β γ β γ γ β γ
−− − = ++ + + + + ≤ + < ≤ + > + . Model (5) is the same as model (4) with 




Model (6):  () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 23
1 2 3 4 5 6 11 1 1 12 1 1 2 13 1 2 3 14 1 3 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it t it t it t it t dr TA TA TA GAP I dr GAP I dr GAP I dr GAP I dr e αα α α α α β γ β γ γ β γ γ β γ
−− − − = + + + + + + ≤+ < ≤+ < ≤+ >+ . Model (7) is the 
same as model (6) with 
it dr  replaced by 
1 it dr
− . 
Model (8):  () () () () () () ()
2 23
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 11 1 2 1 2 11 1 2 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it t t it t dr TA TA TA GAP I dr I GAP GAP I dr I GAP α αα α α α β γ γ β γ γ
−− −− =+ + + + + + ≤ ≤ + ≤ >  
  () () ( ) ()
13 1 1 1 2 14 1 1 1 2 ti t t ti t t t G A P Id r IG A P G A P Id r IG A P e βγ γ βγ γ
−− −− + >≤ + >> +  
Model (9):  () () () () () () ()
2 23
12 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 ln ln lgr lgr lgr lgr ln
it it it it it it it it t it t t it t dr TA TA TA GAP I dr I GAP GAP I dr I GAP α αα α α α β γ γ β γ γ
−− − −− − =+ + + + + + ≤ ≤ + ≤ >  
  () () ( ) ()
13 1 1 1 1 2 14 1 1 1 1 2 ti t t ti t t t GAP I dr I GAP GAP I dr I GAP e βγ γ βγ γ
−− − −− − + >≤ + >> +  
For each model, the Monte Carlo exercises are performed as follows. At each iteration, we randomly select an out-of-sample of 52 banks, leaving 160 banks in sample. Since in the full sample of 212 banks we 
have 73 limited banks (34%), 18 cooperative banks (9%) and 121 mutual banks (57%), we decided to maintain the same percentages for each category in both samples. Therefore in the out-of-sample we have 18 
limited banks, 4 cooperative banks and 30 mutual banks. We then estimate all models in sample, saving the estimated coefficients and thresholds. We thus use these estimated coefficients and thresholds to 
compute the fitted default rates out-of-sample for the 52 banks. We then compute two measures of goodness of fit. The absolute difference between the out-of-sample real value and the fitted one (
ABS L ) and the 
squared difference between the realized and the fitted value of the default rate (





Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
0.1494 0.1480 0.1603 0.1588 0.1840 0.1822 0.1489 0.1628 0.1614 0.1597 0.1483 0.1470 0.1610 0.1596 0.0585 0.0566 0.1527 0.1508
-0.0203 -0.0202 -0.0215 -0.0213 -0.0231 -0.0230 -0.0202 -0.0192 -0.0215 -0.0214 -0.0202 -0.0200 -0.0215 -0.0213 -0.0077 -0.0079 -0.0201 -0.0199
-0.7103 -0.7029 -0.7049 -0.6976 -0.7291 -0.7237 -0.7190 -0.6336 -0.7089 -0.7013 -0.7182 -0.7134 -0.7063 -0.6979 -0.5504 -0.5488 -0.7431 -0.7297
-0.0867 -0.0866 -0.0972 -0.0961 -0.0814 -0.0807 -0.0829 -0.0649 -0.0944 -0.0933 -0.0816 -0.0808 -0.0941 -0.0933 -0.0720 -0.0716 -0.0760 -0.0793
0.1984 0.1958 0.2141 0.2111 0.2180 0.2151 0.1986 0.2101 0.2104 0.2072 0.1983 0.1963 0.2108 0.2077 0.1287 0.1276 0.2108 0.2086
-0.0390 -0.0409 -0.0500 -0.0517 -0.0457 -0.0484 -0.0378 -0.0252 -0.0474 -0.0489 -0.0379 -0.0396 -0.0480 -0.0500 -0.0148 -0.0151 -0.0402 -0.0426
-0.0200 -0.0199 -0.0256 -0.0256 -0.0563 -0.0563 -0.0184 -0.0178 -0.0209 -0.0212 -0.0180 -0.0181 -0.0205 -0.0208 0.0520 0.0521 -0.0249 -0.0231
-0.1550 -0.1536 -0.0978 -0.0985 -0.0221 -0.0222 -0.1107 -0.1022 -0.0454 -0.0455 -0.0928 -0.0981 -0.0453 -0.0444 -0.0699 -0.0702 -0.0207 -0.0211
- - - - - - -0.2314 -0.2095 -0.0997 -0.0992 -0.1671 -0.1738 -0.0756 -0.0868 -0.1935 -0.1932 -0.1083 -0.1035
- - - - - - - - - - -0.2703 -0.2683 -0.1110 -0.1124 0.2045 0.2018 0.0048 0.0063
dr(t-1), GAPT(t-1) dr(t-1) dr(t) dr(t-1) GAPT(t-1) dr(t-1) dr(t) dr(t), GAP(t-1) dr(t)
(9)
2 regimes 3 regimes 4 regimes 4 regimes
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0.767 0.765 0.739 0.742 -1.688 -1.614 0.717 0.714 0.480 0.512 0.696 0.711 0.454 0.512 0.454 0.451 0.606 0.545
- - - - - - 1.044 0.986 0.759 0.743 0.912 0.945 0.695 0.741 -0.178 -0.178 -0.393 -0.219
- - - - - - - - - - 1.202 1.174 0.985 1.065 - - - -
Measures of fit
L ABS 0.225 0.224 0.192 0.192 0.165 0.165 0.290 0.280 0.193 0.192 0.326 0.322 0.203 0.200 0.132 0.131 0.164 0.162
L SQ 0.085 0.083 0.064 0.064 0.051 0.051 0.135 0.126 0.065 0.064 0.170 0.164 0.071 0.069 0.032 0.031 0.050 0.049
dr(t-1), GAPT(t-1) dr(t-1) dr(t) dr(t-1) dr(t), GAP(t-1) dr(t) dr(t-1) GAPT(t-1) dr(t)
(9)
2 regimes 3 regimes 4 regimes 4 regimes
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